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A Scion of the Crimean Khans in the
Crimean War: The Allied Powers and the
Question of the Future of the Crimea
HAKAN KIRIMLI
The great political crisis which had been troubling the European powers for some time
culminated with the landing of the Allied (i.e. British, French, and Ottoman) troops in
the Crimea, then part of the Russian empire, in September 1854, thereby starting what
was to be called the ‘Crimean War’. Though the Ottoman and Russian empires had
already been fighting for a year, the military involvement of the British and French
(as well as the political stance of Austria) turned the conflict into a ‘global’ one. The
fighting on the Crimean peninsula was far more rapidly and thoroughly covered by
the press and monitored by the public than the previous wars, thanks to the presence
of war correspondents on the very frontline and the introduction of remarkable inno-
vations, such as the telegraph, photography, and other novel products of ‘advanced
technology’. Thus, the relatively small and seemingly unnoticed Crimean peninsula
instantly became the focus of worldwide attention. Any kind of information about
the Crimea, not only the news about the present occurrences there, but also general
narratives on the history, nature, and inhabitants of the land were in high public de-
mand. Not surprisingly, earlier travelling accounts of the Russian empire, with specif-
ic attention to the Crimea, were widely published or republished in the West.
As a matter of fact, the Crimea had the features of being far more than an ordinary
province of the vast Russian empire and was by no means devoid of a particular iden-
tity. The Crimea had been annexed to Russia only in 1783, just 70 years before the
Crimean War, as a result of long wars. It was a land with a deep historical tradition
of independent statehood and large number of non-Russian and non-Christian (over-
whelmingly Muslim) indigenous inhabitants. At the beginning of the war, Turkic and
Muslim Crimean Tatars, the native people of the peninsula, still constituted the abso-
lute majority of the population of the Crimea.1 Actually, the Crimean Tatars used to
have their own statehood, i.e. the Crimean Khanate, comprising the Crimea and the
large steppes on the mainland, from the early fifteenth century up to 1783 (not to men-
tion the earlier political formations they had been successors to).
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The Crimean Khanate was a direct successor to the empire of the Golden Horde.
The ruling dynasty of the Crimean Khanate was the house of Gerays. It was believed
that Gerays had a direct lineage to Chinghis Khan through his son Juji. When the cen-
tral power in the Golden Horde began to shatter and disintegrate during the first half
of the fifteenth century, the Chinghiside prince Gıyaseddin and his son Hacı Geray,
having been based on the Crimean peninsula, established themselves in the southern
parts of the Golden Horde to claim the throne of the Great Khan. Actually, the body
politic thus formed became a state in its own right, which was called the
Crimean Khanate, though its rulers never renounced their claims over the whole of
the Golden Horde terrain until the bitter end. That particular Chinghiside dynasty
descending from Hacı Geray was named the Geray dynasty after its founder’s cogno-
men. For some three-and-a-half centuries, the Gerays incontestably ruled the
Crimean Khanate. The house of Geray was more than a dynasty with an
unchallengeable right to rule the Crimean Khanate; it was one of the most respected
Islamic dynasties whose legitimacy was beyond question, so much so that it was even
commonly argued that, in the case of the extinction of the Ottoman dynasty, the
Gerays could be the only alternative to replace them on the former’s throne.2
The Crimean Khanate was a major power in Eastern European politics, which contin-
ued this status even after it had become a vassal state of the Ottoman empire. Notwith-
standing the supreme suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, the Crimean Khanate retained
almost all vestiges of sovereignty, such as having its own ruling dynasty, distinct state
structure and traditions, establishing diplomatic relations with other states, minting its
own coins, etc. For the most part of its existence, the Crimean Khanate was by no means
politically, psychologically or militarily inferior to Russia: it always considered itself the
direct continuation of the empire of the Golden Horde which had ruled over the Russian
lands for two centuries. It was not until 1700 that Muscovy ceased to pay the Crimean
Khans the annual tribute going back to the times of the Golden Horde.3 The military
might of the Crimean Khanate was more than able to stave off the Russian advance
towards the south well into the second half of the eighteenth century.
In 1783, after 15 years of war and anarchy, the Crimean Khanate was destroyed
and its territories were annexed to Russia. Following the annexation, within a short
time all male members of the Geray dynasty who belonged to the direct line of succes-
sion left or were forced by the tsarist rulers to leave the Crimea. Thus deprived of their
homeland, the Gerays took refuge mostly in the Ottoman empire, settling either in the
Rumelian provinces4 or in the north-western Caucasian territories of the sultan.
Many of those who went to the north-western Caucasus eventually dwelled among
the Nogay or Adyge (‘Circassian’) tribes there, not necessarily under direct (or even
indirect) Ottoman authority.5 The departure of the Gerays from the Crimea also sig-
nalled the beginning of the great exodus of their people too: in the course of almost a
century and a half, hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars would emigrate to the
Ottoman empire in large waves.
The majority of Gerays in the Ottoman empire settled in those parts of Rumelia
which constitute today’s Bulgaria and Turkish Thrace. As matter of fact, since at least
the sixteenth century the Ottomans had granted large estates to the members of the
Geray dynasty in these provinces. Though never severing their ties with the Crimea,
hundreds of Gerays lived in Rumelia. They had included those who had previously
been deposed from power in the Crimea and had been awaiting better days. Actually,

































they could select the best ones to send to rule the Crimea. With the demise of the Cri-
mean Khanate, the numbers of the Rumelian Gerays were complemented by many
newcomers from the Crimea.
Apart from their historical status in the Crimea, Gerays in Rumelia played impor-
tant roles on the local scale long after the fall of the Crimean Khanate. With their un-
questionable credentials and the deep-seated respect they enjoyed, they were sui
generis notables who had a certain place in the socio-political balance of power in
Rumelia. Almost all Gerays in Rumelia practically functioned as the administrators
of the regions surrounding their mansions. Besides serving in political and administra-
tive capacities, the members of the Geray pedigree in the Ottoman empire undertook
military roles as well. Particularly during the Ottoman–Russian and Ottoman–Habs-
burg wars in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, several Gerays assumed com-
manding posts in the Ottoman army, displayed distinction, and many of them were
wounded, taken prisoner, or killed in action.
As a matter of fact, during the first half of the nineteenth century, there were more
than 100 male Gerays residing in various parts of Rumelia.6 One of the important
Geray mansions in Rumelia was in the village of Vyrbitsa near Ôumnu (Shumen) in
what is today eastern Bulgaria. It is known that at least since the second half of the
seventeenth century the Gerays had established themselves in Vyrbitsa.7 Arslan Geray
Sultan, the prince who resided in Vyrbitsa in early 1740s,8 later became the Crimean
Khan in the years 1747–56 and 1767.9 For more than two centuries the line of Gerays,
descended from Arslan Geray Khan, resided in Vyrbitsa and the county of Gerlobad,
which included several villages other than Vyrbitsa.
Though none of them became khans, the offspring of Arslan Geray Khan also rose
to prominence in the Crimea or in Rumelia. His son Mesud Geray Sultan became the
qalgay under Qırım Geray Khan.10 Mesud Geray Sultan lost his life while fighting
against the Russians in defence of the Ottoman fortress of Yerg€og€u (Giurgiu) in 1771
during the Ottoman–Russian War.11 Mesud Geray Sultan’s sons, especially Cengiz
Mehmed Geray Sultan and Bahadır Geray Sultan, played important roles in
Rumelia. Although both of them stood out due to their gallantry during the
Ottoman–Russian War of 1787–92, during the following decade they were actively
involved in the tumultuous power struggle in Rumelia and were outlawed by the
Ottoman government. Cengiz Mehmed Geray Sultan was especially prominent in the
Rumelian events in 1799–1803 as an ally of Osman Pazvandoglu, the famous Rume-
lian power magnate and the unruly pasha of Vidin. Pardoned and rehabilitated by the
sultan, Bahadır Geray lived to participate in the Ottoman–Russian War of 1806–12.
In 1807, he was given the command of the Tatar troops of the Ottoman
empire with the title of qalgay, notwithstanding the fact that the Crimean Khanate no
longer existed for almost a quarter of a century.12 Bahadır Geray Sultan fought with
distinction in the war until he was taken prisoner by the Russians.13
Bahadır Geray Sultan was succeeded by his son Mesud Geray Sultan in
Vyrbitsa.14 The latter was born sometime during 1810s.15 His mother was H€urm€uz
Hanım.16 Apparently, Mesud Geray Sultan inherited the post and role of his father at
a young age. Like his forefathers, he enjoyed considerable influence and authority
in the region. It was he who built the great mansion of the Gerays in Vyrbitsa in
1835–36 which would remain standing until the 1970s.17 At time of the outbreak of
the Ottoman–Russian War in 1853, Mesud Geray Sultan, who was known to his
contemporaries as ‘the Lame Sultan’, was residing there.
































Mesud Geray Sultan was a controversial figure, having plenty of friends and foes
at both local and central levels. Some sources described him as an oppressor and ex-
ploiter of his subjects, while others praised him as the benevolent protector of the local
people, especially the Bulgarians.18 The latter group of sources describes him as a self-
taught surgeon and an altruistic man who cured the local sick and wounded.19
A lawsuit against him provided clues about his personality and local standing. In
1852, he, together with his younger brother Mehmed Geray, was sued by a number of
locals under the charges of severely oppressing and terrorizing the people of the
48 villages in the county of Gerlobad, to the extent of burning their houses and even
committing murder. He was also accused of embezzling money from the locals, hav-
ing a dungeon underneath his mansion complete with ‘punitive instruments’ such as
fetters and shackles, and of keeping the wife of a Gypsy man as his mistress. The sui-
tors demanded not only the appropriate legal action against these Gerays, but also
their banishment from the region forever. The incriminating evidence against the
Geray Sultans in Vyrbitsa appeared strong enough, as witnesses included not only a
number of local villagers and notables, but it was clearly backed by the provincial ex-
ecutive and judicial officials, including the county head himself.20
The Geray Sultan had no less an impressive company of local supporters. When
Mesud Geray appeared in the courtroom to face the charges, 30 to 40 of his backers
were also there to testify on his behalf. During the process, when Mesud Geray
Sultan smiled at the accusations, the county head H€useyin Aga slapped him on the
face, and later Mesud Geray, together with his brother Mehmed Geray and all their
supporters, were imprisoned for two months.21 However, the response of Mesud
Geray to this public indignity was to appeal to the higher authorities and set in
motion his connections in Istanbul. Thus, the whole case was investigated by the
Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye). The
Geray Sultan totally denied the gravamen and all other accusations. He stated that all
these were fabrications and a plot organized against him by the county head H€useyin
Aga and the kadı (judge) Karamanzâde Hasan Efendi. The public humiliation meted
out to him by the county head, who had cursed and slapped him, was unacceptable
for anybody, let alone someone of his pedigree, as a result of which shame he could
not live in his house for six months. Mesud Geray Sultan asserted that he had been
unjustly kept in jail for 50 days and during this time his farm had been left unattended.
Moreover, the county head had forcibly removed his caretakers and workers from his
farm and all his animals had been left to die.22
The Geray Sultan defended himself against the charges by stating that the people
were forced or lured to testify against him, that all the charges were slanderous, that
his ‘dungeon’ was meant only to keep captured highwaymen and other criminals in
the region before handing them over to the authorities, that the woman allegedly kept
by him was actually an orphan who had been raised in the Geray mansion as a foster
child, etc. Mesud Geray’s position was supported by the testimonials of several local
dignitaries and people who described him as a pious and honest man devoted to chari-
table work and accused the officials of being the true oppressors and explained their
iniquitous deeds.23
Finally, in October 1852, the Supreme Council ruled, accepting the innocence of
Mesud Geray and condemning the local officials and dignitaries who incriminated

































Efendi were not only dismissed from their posts, but both were sentenced to be exiled
to Varna for a year. In the verdict, Mesud Geray Sultan was only warned that he
should not imprison any culprits or accused persons in his personal mansion and that
he should hand them immediately to the law enforcement authorities.24
In such a case involving hundreds of litigants, defendants, and eyewitnesses with
conflicting arguments and interests, it is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of the
claims and counterclaims. There can be no doubt that personal influences and connec-
tions played a weighty role throughout the conduct of this case. Putting aside the
question whether Mesud Geray was actually an innocent victim of slanderous accusa-
tions, or whether he was able to manipulate the process of the trial to some degree to
produce such a favourable conclusion to the case, one might suggest that he must in-
deed have had some powerful connections and supporters in Istanbul as well as in his
‘domains’.
At the very time Mesud Geray was suffering with his personal problems, the
Ottoman capital was being hard pressed by far more serious matters. The ‘Eastern
Question’ once more evolved into an international crisis which diplomatic efforts
were unable to resolve. In June 1853, Russian troops occupied the Ottoman
Danubian Principalities and on 4 October 1853 the Porte declared war on Russia. By
the end of October, fighting between the Ottoman and Russian armies had started
on the Danubian front. On 27 and 28 March 1854, Britain and France also joined
the war on the side of the Turks.
Soon French and British troops set sail to the Turkish Straits to join the Ottoman
armies. In May 1854, large numbers of French and English forces began to be
deployed at Varna against the invading Russians, together with the Ottoman army
which was already in the area. The commanders-in-chief of all three armies also came
to Varna to discuss their joint course of action; it became clear by summer that this
would involve a landing on the Crimean peninsula.
While all these preparations were going on in Varna and the surrounding areas on
the Ôumnu road, Devna and Aladin, Mesud Geray Sultan was residing in the village
of Vyrbitsa, not far from the Allied headquarters. Sometime during summer 1854, he
established contact with the French army stationed at Varna and conveyed his wish
to join the French army and participate in the war. It is not known why Mesud Geray,
an Ottoman subject, appealed to the French rather than the Ottomans. In reply to
Mesud Geray, General Vansky, the French chief executive officer in Varna, addressed
him ‘Son Altesse’ in reference to his royal background, and stated that the Geray’s re-
quest was accepted and that he was assigned to the French troops in the Crimea with
the rank of major.25
The French at Varna must have been informed about the credentials of Mesud
Geray Sultan and the significance of his pedigree. It is obvious that, preparing their
landing on Crimean soil, the French intended to utilize the historical memory and in-
fluence of the Gerays over the Crimean Tatars in the person of Mesud Geray. In any
case, the fact that Mesud Geray sailed to the Crimea with the commander-in-chief of
the French army, Marshal Achille Le Roy Saint-Arnaud, in early September 185426
testified to the importance the French attached to Mesud Geray Sultan.
On 13 September 1854, when the Allied soldiers began to land near Kezlev (in
Russian: Yevpatoriia), Mesud Geray Sultan and the Polish emigre officer Wilhelm
Tokarski were sent to the town as Allied emissaries to talk to the inhabitants,
































a majority of whom were Crimean Tatars.27 It seemed natural that they were chosen
to communicate with the locals, as the former naturally spoke the language of his
compatriots, while the Pole was fluent in Russian.
Addressing a sympathetic Crimean Tatar crowd which they met, Tokarski declared
that Russian rule was over and now they had to obey the Allied high command. He
said, ‘From now on, the Crimea will not belong to Russia, but it will become free and
independent under the protection of France’.28 Notwithstanding the fact that these
unauthorized words had little to do with official French policies, the crowd was
happy.
Having learned about his presence, special enthusiasm was displayed to Mesud
Geray Sultan.29 The crowd raised him on their shoulders. The exultant people also
kissed the hands and uniforms of those Turkish soldiers who were present there.
Mesud Geray, together with Tokarski and a large number of Crimean Tatars, walked
to a mosque (in all likelihood the Khan’s Mosque –Han Camii) and offered a thanks-
giving prayer. Later, both Mesud Geray Sultan and Tokarski resided in the house of
the Karaim merchant Kaskaçı in Kezlev.30
During his time in the Crimea, Mesud Geray stayed in Kezlev. In the absence of
sufficient evidence, the details of his activities in the Crimea are yet to be clarified.
Moreover, the surviving documents give contradictory information about his role
there. He had arrived in the Crimea embedded in the French troops, and had no offi-
cial bearing with the Ottoman army, though he was an Ottoman subject. Yet the Rus-
sians, if not also the Crimean Tatars, considered him the official representative of the
Ottoman empire or even an Ottoman pasha.31 As for the British, they gave no counte-
nance to the service of this Crimean Tatar prince in the Crimea from the very start,32
though at times they had to cooperate with him to a certain extent.
Apparently, Mesud Geray undertook some sort of administrative work in Kezlev,
or rather played the role of an intermediary between the Allied forces and the native
Crimean Tatars. During the first days of the Allied occupational administration in
Kezlev, Mesud Geray helped the three Allied commanders stationed there in main-
taining order in the city and forming a local police force.33
In September and October 1854 the limited number of Allied forces were in a pre-
carious situation in Kezlev. As the main body of the Allied armies were marching
southwards toward Sevastopol, during the first weeks of their occupation, there were
only a few hundred Allied troops in the town, which was defenceless and lacking any
fortifications.34 It was also imperative to bring cattle and grain into the town from the
hinterland, and to safeguard them from the attacks of the Cossacks. In the face of the
severe lack of Allied troops in Kezlev, such critical patrolling duty could only be
entrusted to the local Crimean Tatars. Against all odds, this hurriedly organized Cri-
mean Tatar militia performed a very good job. The British governor of Kezlev, Cap-
tain Saumarez Brock, reported to Vice-Admiral J.W.D. Dundas:
We had now hitherto been little molested by the enemy, who had given us time to
strengthen our position by ditches, palisades, &c.; but their videttes began to
show themselves, and occasionally skirmishes took place with our mounted
Tatars, who evinced a great deal of courage and determination in their conduct
before the enemy. The Tatar arms consisting of scythes set on poles, and rude fir

































simple means they managed to save many of their flocks and herds from being
carried off.35
The number of Crimean Tatar militia in Kezlev soon reached 800.36 Apparently,
Mesud Geray played an important role in enlisting people into this militia. Yet some
reports from both the Russian and English sides alleged that his conduct was far from
flawless. In a Russian intelligence report, it was stated that he had not only demanded
money from the people while enlisting them into the militia, but had also asked the
militia to bring him the booty from the enemy. He allegedly dealt very harshly with
the locals.37 Another Russian intelligence note claimed that at times even a high-rank-
ing Turkish official (probably Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman fleet commander) from
the anchored fleet had come to the town and reproached Mesud Geray for leading the
Crimean Tatars astray and ordering them to plunder.38
Captain Brock was no more sympathetic in his comments about Mesud Geray: ‘[He
was] so utterly corrupt and villainous in his transactions with the natives, that he was
reflecting great discredit on the allied cause, and pillaging all those peaceful inhabi-
tants who looked to us for protection’.39 According to Captain Brock, that was why
Mesud Geray’s activities in the Crimea did not last long and, by a joint decision of
the British and French commanders of Kezlev, he was sent back to Turkey.40 By late
October he was in Istanbul.41
Mesud Geray’s activities in the Crimea, however, were reflected in a very different
way in the Ottoman documents. In a common testament of the three Allied
commanders in Kezlev, including Captain Brock himself, addressed to the Ottoman
authorities, it was stated that Mesud Geray had ‘resigned from his job’ and he was
highly praised for his services to the Allied forces and for establishing the security of
the region around Kezlev.42 Perhaps this document might have been prepared in order
to send Mesud Geray away from Kezlev as soon as possible in an honourable fashion.
Another document bearing the signatures of several Crimean Tatar dignitaries, elders,
clerics, and other men of stature from the Kezlev region (with more than 220 signa-
tures) testified to their contentment due to the presence of the Allied troops there and
to the activities of Mesud Geray. They also pledged to sacrifice their lives for the sake
of the Ottoman state and to serve its army.43 The testimony of a Crimean Tatar vol-
unteer militiaman after his emigration to the Ottoman empire also provides somewhat
different information from the English and Russian reports. Here, the ex-militiaman
attested that he had commanded a 12-man mounted platoon in Kezlev under Mesud
Geray and that they had captured large numbers of sheep from the enemy. They had
submitted these sheep to Mesud Geray Sultan and they had been used to provision
the volunteer militia.44
Whatever the true nature of Mesud Geray in the Crimea might have been, we know
that he was eventually awarded the order of Legion d’honneur by the French.45 In
April 1855 the Ottomans also decorated him in a similar way ‘for his commendable
service in the Crimea’.46 Having returned from his ancestral homeland, Mesud Geray
settled back in his mansion in the village of Vyrbitsa. There he seems to have contin-
ued the typical life of a Geray in Rumelia. He was still prestigious and respected.
His matrimonial stories involving a local Bulgarian girl (or girls) became popular
tales which long survived him in the region.47 In the meantime, he continued to
receive the special salary granted to the members of the Geray family by the
































sultan.48 An incident which took place possibly some time during 1860s made him
a very popular figure among the local Bulgarians. A number of Bulgarian rebels, flee-
ing from the Ottoman security forces, took refuge in the mansion of Mesud Geray
Sultan. When the Ottoman officers asked the Geray Sultan to surrender them, the
latter categorically refused to do so on the grounds that they were his guests. Cogni-
zant of the Geray Sultan’s authority, the officers could only bow respectfully
and leave.49
Mesud Geray died on 11 January 1869.50 After the independence of Bulgaria, his
son Mehmed Ali Muhyeddin Geray was elected to the Bulgarian parliament. His
descendants emigrated to Turkey in successive waves during the twentieth century.51
The brief venture of Mesud Geray in the Crimea was more than an interesting slice
in the life of a Crimean Tatar prince in Rumelia; it had important implications for the
outlook and plans of the Porte, as well of its Allies, regarding the future of the Cri-
mea. At first sight, the dispatch of a member of the Crimean royal dynasty to
the Crimean war front might make one think of the existence of a scheme involving
the restoration of the former Crimean Khanate. Yet there is no evidence of such a
scheme. Did the Allies have any plans for the future of the peninsula on which they
fought so bitterly? In fact, the occasion of the seemingly unnoticed affair of Mesud
Geray leads us to inquire more broadly into the war aims and designs of the Allies
concerning the future of the Crimea, going far beyond the personal story of this pro-
vincial Crimean prince.
First and foremost, the Crimean peninsula was chosen as the place for the strike
against the Russian empire on purely military, strategic, and psychological grounds.
The choice of the Crimea was not related to a particular plan by the Allies concerning
the future of this land, though a few statesmen would indeed cherish such ideas as
events unfolded.
When Britain and France entered the war on the side of the Ottoman empire, they
had no intention of simply continuing the ‘Ottoman war’ against Russia, that is,
supporting the Ottomans in line with the concerns and aims of the latter. Rather,
each country had its own objective in fighting against Russia on the regional and
global scale. Therefore, while Allied political and military circles began to mull over
the nature and direction of joint military action against Russia, they were guided by
their own different strategic aims. The Ottomans were primarily concerned with
recovering the occupied lands and stabilizing their position against Russia, rather
than dreaming about conquests. Britain was thinking of disabling Russia to hinder
its southward expansion at the expense of the Ottoman empire which thereby threat-
ened the British interests. Bonapartist France was trying to make the best of this
crisis to raise its prestige and weight in the European, if not global, political arena.
None of the Allies had any large-scale invasion of Russia in mind. Conscious of their
naval supremacy, the Allied powers thought of dealing a hard blow to Russia which
would win prestige for them and cripple Russia, forcing it to accept a favourable
peace.52
British military and political circles considered Sevastopol, which was a fortified
port at the south-western corner of the Crimean peninsula and the bastion of the Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet directed against the heart of the Ottoman empire, as the most
suitable target among few other alternatives (e.g. the Russian Black Sea forts adjacent

































contemplating an attack on Sevastopol and the destruction of the Russian fleet,
among other options.54 By March 1854, both sides agreed in favouring an operation
whose aim was the capture and destruction of Sevastopol.55
On 9 May 1854, the Emperor Napoleon III ordered his commander-in-chief,
Marshall Saint-Arnaud, to look for advantageous ground to fight a battle against the
advancing Russians on the Danubian front; if they did not advance, then to attack the
Crimea.56 The Times, on 15 June 1854, succinctly explained the intentions of many
leading figures in London by stating that Britain had to teach the Russians a lesson
they would not forget. The London newspaper wrote, ‘We hold, therefore, that the tak-
ing of Sebastopol and the occupation of the Crimea are objects which would repay all
the cost of the present war, and would permanently settle in our favour the principal
questions now in dispute’.57 Finally, the British cabinet sanctioned an amphibious oper-
ation on the Crimea on 27 June 1854.58 The French, after some hesitation to
determine the purpose of the Russians, as well as to ascertain the attitude of the
Austrians, also agreed formally to attack Sevastopol.59 However, the Ottomans, who
had long been fighting against the Russian armies on the Danubian front, were more
interested in pushing back their adversaries there. The Ottoman commander-in-chief,
€Omer Pasha, was in favour of an offensive in the direction of Bessarabia.60
Thus, while contemplating a descent on the Crimea, the designs of the Allied
powers were almost purely military in nature and included hardly any plans for the
political future of the peninsula. That the Crimea was inhabited mostly by the Cri-
mean Tatars was certainly noted by the Allies, who counted the former’s potential
sympathies as among the favourable considerations in designating the Crimea. The
presence of a common belief in Britain about the disaffection of the Crimean Tatars
against Russia and sympathy towards Turkey (together with some doubts) was also
voiced at the British Parliament on 24 July 1854.61 At the beginning of the Crimean
campaign The Times stated:
In the Crimea there is great reason to suppose that if the inhabitants are kindly
treated, paid for their produce, and made to understand the object of the expedi-
tion, they will be more ready to sympathize with the invaders than to assist their
former masters. The Turkish division of the army will serve as a link between
the Mahomedan population and the European forces; for although nearly
70 years have elapsed since the Turks were compelled to evacuate their last posi-
tion in the Crimea, the country has not lost its Tartar character, and it was
thought by no means impossible that with a little assistance from the other side
of the Black Sea the population would be disposed to rise against the Russian
yoke.62
One should also remember that, at the same time, the concept of ‘Tartar’ (Tatar) did
not always have pleasant connotations in Britain. The word ‘Tartar’ was used fre-
quently to denote the ‘barbarian’ or ‘Asiatic’ nature of the Russians, or it was used
synonymously with the latter.63
To be sure, especially before the actual start of the hostilities, a number of high-
ranking British figures had the idea of impeding the southward expansion of the
Russian empire by means of establishing some kind of a buffer zone of friendly states
in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. Such a ‘buffer zone’ would certainly include
































the Crimea, which would be detached from the Russian empire. A few unpublicized
statements by some of the highest British dignitaries at the earliest stages of the war
are examples of these schemes. Such were the ‘beau ideals’ of Lord Palmerston, then
the British home secretary, which he expressed to the cabinet in a memorandum on 19
March 1854, shortly before the British declaration of war against Russia. There, he
mentioned several proposed radical territorial changes on the map of Russia and even
central Europe, which included the ‘return’ of the Crimea to the Ottoman empire.64
Palmerston would repeat and elaborate these ‘possibilities’ of changing the post-war
European map to Lord Clarendon, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, in
his letter dated 6 April 1854. There he wrote:
we want to engage Sweden to join us and we mean to offer her Aland and possi-
bly Finland. We want Prussia to join us, and the Results of the war might raise
the Question whether some Part of the German Provinces of Russia on the
Baltic might or might not be added to Prussia, in Exchange for the Polish Part of
the Duchy of Posen in the Event of a Restoration of the Kingdom of Poland;
and such a Restoration, not under a Russian Prince, would probably be the best
security for the Independence of Germany. We want Austria to join us, and it
may be doubtful whether it would be advisable to shut out the Possibility of an
arrangement by which Austria might have the Principalities and the mouths of
the Danube so as to cut off Russia from Turkey, Austria giving up in exchange
her Italian Provinces, and Turkey being indemnified by the Crimea, the Eastern
Shore of the Black Sea and Georgia.65
‘All these arrangements [which might] at present be justly regarded as Day
Dreams’, as Palmerston admitted, were after all possible measures to induce the be-
nevolence, if not the alliance, of critical European states at the beginning of the war.
In those days, Palmerston also cogitated over the possibilities of crippling Russia and
creating a buffer zone around it to render it harmless. He wrote:
The best and most effectual security for the future Peace of Europe would be the
severance from Russia of some of the frontier territories acquired by her in later
Times, Georgia, Circassia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland and Finland. If these
were taken from her she would still remain an enormous Power, but far less ad-
vantageously posted for aggression on her neighbours.66
Certainly, Palmerston’s schemes were not the accepted war aims of Britain. In fact,
Palmerston seriously differed from Lord Aberdeen, the then prime minister, who
thought that attempting to impose the ideas of the former on Russia would plunge
Europe into another Thirty Years War.67 Many others in Britain also dismissed Pal-
merston’s schemes as leading to a long war.68
The British ambassador to the Ottoman empire, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe,
also cherished the idea of creating a series of buffer states in the Black Sea area. Such
a settlement, in Stratford’s words, would be something
by which the course of the Danube would be free, the [Danubian] Principalities

































restored to independence under the suzerainete of the Porte, the Crimea estab-
lished in a similar manner, the Black Sea opened to foreign ships of war, and
Poland restored in the limits recognized by the Congress of Vienna.69
During the first month of the Allied landing on Crimean soil when the capture of Sev-
astopol seemed imminent, Palmerston became more impassioned about realizing his
‘beau ideals’. His letter to Clarendon a week before the Allies landed in Crimea gave a
quite detailed view of his desired version of territorial changes after the victory:
[T]he Crimea might be given up to Turkey and this would on the whole be the
best. We must hope that the war will not End without the Russians being driven
out of Georgia and Circassia and the Sea of Azof, and if Turkey got Possession
of those Quarters the Crimea would link on well enough. Then again we may rea-
sonably look to wresting from Russia the Mouths of the Danube on the other
Side of the Black Sea. If the Turks had the Command of the Black Sea, and if
their Fleet was put into good order which it might easily be when no longer
cooped up in the Bosphorus, they might be well able to hold the Crimea against
the Russians as they have held the Line of the Danube and its Fortresses.
Such an arrangement would be the only real Security for Constantinople.
As to making the Crimea an independent State that is of Course out of the Ques-
tion; it is too small a Country for such a State of Existence.
An adverse Critic might say catch and kill your Bear before you determine what
you will do with the Skin, but I think our Bear is as good as taken.70
The secretary of state for foreign affairs was at variance with Palmerston in regard to
the fate of the Crimea however. Writing to Lord John Russell, the prominent Whig
politician and the leader of the House of Commons, on 9 September 1854, Clarendon
stated: ‘Palmerston wants to give [the Crimea] to the Turks; but that will never do,
and Stratford in his letter to-day deprecates in the strongest terms adding one inch of
territory to the Sultan’s dominions.’71
After the first Allied victory on Crimean soil, that is, the Battle of Alma, Palmerston’s
Bear seemed even closer to being caught. On 27 September 1854, a confident Clarendon
wrote to Stratford considering the possible and preferable options following the seizure
of Sevastopol. Clarendon was in favour of retaining this celebrated naval base not only
to provide a suitable shelter for passing the winter (as appears to have been the opinion
of Napoleon III too). He was against the idea of demolishing the base once it was cap-
tured, since such an act would have implied that the Allies were intending eventually to
return Sevastopol to Russians, thereby losing its value as a bargaining chip in the future
peace negotiations. Once the city was securely in their hands, the Allies could deliberate
quietly how to dispose of that territory. The British secretary of state was also concerned
about the fate of the Crimean Tatars:
We should however be delivering up to [the tsar’s] tender mercies the Tartars who
have (as appears to be the case) committed themselves in our favour – wherefore
































this latter point – I have the strongest feeling, for if we have accepted the services
of these poor people and thereby exposed them to Russia’s vengeance, they must
not be deserted [underlined in the original].72
He did not clarify the way in which the Crimean Tatars should not be betrayed.
For Clarendon, the retention (at least for the time being) of Sevastopol would be
‘the best counterpoise to Austrian occupation of the Principalities’. As the British and
French would have permanent quarters on the Black Sea, the command of
Constantinople, and the mouths of the Danube, a position which would suggest the
possibility of stirring up the Hungarian and Slavic subjects of the Habsburg Kaiser, it
‘would wholly extinguish any project of mediation that may be lurking in the
Austrian mind’. He was also troubled by the possibility of the emergence of a quarrel
between the British and French allies, as Napoleon might change his mind and decide
to keep Sevastopol for himself if the naval port was not demolished. If possible,
Clarendon would prefer not to restore the Crimea to Russia, but he displayed his
reservations by stating ‘the Crimea cannot shift for itself and I don’t see what Power
we can establish there capable of withstanding Russian vicinage’. Like Stratford, he
was also against ‘adding an inch to existing Turkish territory’. The final settlements of
the questions of Georgia and Circassia were to be complicated too, because the British
should look to check the Russian advance towards Persia and India without, however,
committing to engagements beyond their capabilities. On that account, he believed
that spending the winter securely in Sevastopol and gaining time to think about the
disposal of the Crimea would be the best solution.73 Incidentally, the hopes for estab-
lishing winter quarters in Sevastopol would not be realized as the Russian fortress
was to hold out for a year. The next day Palmerston repeated his views to Clarendon
on these issues:
Now as to the Crimea, what is the Thing most to be avoided. Evidently the resto-
ration of that Country to Russia. The Possession of the Crimea gives to
Russia the Command of the Black Sea, and a Predominance over Turkey, you
may blow up the Sea Defences, and the Land defences, you may burn the Maga-
zines and destroy the Docks, but you cannot alter the Geographical Position or
the Topographical arrangement of Sebastopol, and in spite of any Engagements
to the Contrary, Russia would soon reestablish Sebastopol as a formidable naval
Station. She would not want works of Defences. The Natural Harbour would be
enough. Her building Station would be Nicholaeff or some other Place. All she
would want at Sebastopol would be Stores and Magazines; and her Fleet lying
there in Safety would be ready to threaten every Part of the Black Sea. . . .
But if the Crimea is not to be restored to Russia how is it to be disposed of?
Why should it not be given to Turkey? Turkey it is said could not keep it. I doubt
this. The Turks have shewn themselves good Hands at defensive warfare. If
Turkey had Sebastopol she would be the dominant naval Power in the Black
Sea, and if her navy was got into good order which it then might be by cruises
and exercise in the Euxine she could secure the Crimea against Invasion by Sea,


































Moreover if the Crimea were Turkish the Tables would be turned against Russia,
Odessa would be exposed and Constantinople secure. Then too we may I hope
look to driving the Russians out of Georgia and Circassia, and that would make
the Possession of the Crimea by Turkey more easy and more secure.74
Palmerston was strongly in favour of the Allied armies wintering in the Crimea and
keen not to destroy the defences of Sevastopol when the city was captured by the
Allies. Apart from any other considerations, as had already been argued by
Clarendon, the destruction of these defences would mean that the Allies were
determined to restore Sevastopol to Russia after the war.75
His influence then and later throughout the Crimean War notwithstanding,
Palmerston was certainly in no position to tailor the British policy alone. His stance over
the future of the Crimea was not shared by others, including his then political allies. For
instance, Russell’s suggestion of a post-war treaty between the belligerents, dated 1 Octo-
ber 1854, stipulated that the pre-war boundaries of Russia and Turkey should be pre-
served. A special article on the plans for the Crimea stated that the peninsula might be
restored or not restored to Russia, in case it would be restored the fortifications at Sevas-
topol should be destroyed.76 Aberdeen too preferred that, when captured, the fortifica-
tions of Sevastopol be immediately razed and the city evacuated.77
At this time the issue of the future status of the Crimea was raised by Edouard
Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign minister, in his conversation with Henry
Wellesley Lord Cowley, the British ambassador to France. As Cowley informed
London, Drouyn de Lhuys discussed the question whether to keep or abandon
Sevastopol when it was captured, if occupied whether the Allied occupation should be
confined to the city or to be extended over the Crimea, and whether the defences of
Sevastopol would be destroyed or maintained. The French foreign minister was in fa-
vour of occupying Sevastopol, and while he said that the matter of extending the occu-
pation to the rest of the Crimean peninsula would be a decision depending on strategic
measures to be made by the commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies, he made it
clear that he would like to see the whole of the Crimea occupied. He saw three options
for disposing of the Crimea:
It might be restored to Russia. It might be again placed under the rule of the Sultan.
Or it might remain in the possession of the French and English. In neither of these
cases would there be any necessity for preserving the fortifications. If the Crimea
was restored to Russia it must be restored shorn of that which gave Russia such pre-
ponderance in the Black Sea. If it was to be again placed under the rule of the Sultan,
it would not be prudent to place the Porte in possession of a Place of such military
importance. As the Russian fleet would be destroyed the Porte would have nothing
to fear from outward attack and would have no need of defences as now existed.
Lastly, if the Crimea was to remain in the hands of the French and English, as they
would have nothing to fear from maritime aggressions it was clear that they could
do without impregnable fortifications. For all these reasons [Drouyn de Lhuys]
should prefer to see the defensive works of the Crimea destroyed at once.78
In his reply to the French foreign minister, Cowley, among other things, said that
he contemplated only two of the three contingencies
































as possible with regard to the Crimea – that it should be restored to Russia, or
replaced under the authority of the Porte, for as France and England had de-
clared that in engaging in this war they renounced beforehand all advantage to
themselves they could hardly keep possession of the Crimea or any part of it
without placing themselves in contradiction to this declaration.79
The Emperor Napoleon III was also disturbed by the same question. In this regard,
Marshal Jean-Baptiste Philibert Vaillant, the French minister of war, wrote to Gener-
al François Certain de Canrobert, who had become the French commander-in-chief
in the Crimea after Saint-Arnaud’s death, on 10 November 1854. The emperor was
considering keeping the Crimea by maintaining a sufficient force there. However,
Vaillant differed on this subject. Together with all problems of maintaining and provi-
sioning an army of 80,000 to occupy the Crimea, the marshal questioned the prudence
of not being able to use them in Germany on the Rhine in case of any uncertainty. At
any rate, the Crimea needed to be strongly fortified if it was to be defended against
the Russians. If the peninsula were returned to Russia eventually, all these would
have been wasted. Vaillant also discussed the options of making the Crimea an inde-
pendent state or handing it to the Ottoman empire. The marshal believed that the in-
dependence of the Crimea would not last more than three months and Russia would
regain it, together with the undestroyed fortifications of Sevastopol. The worst choice
would be to turn the Crimea over to the Ottomans, who were not capable of defend-
ing such a gift; they would either be beaten by Russians, or sell the Crimea to the lat-
ter. According to Vaillant, therefore, if Sevastopol were to be seized, the best solution
would be to destroy all its defences, to tear down its fortresses, and to fill up its port
with earth from its hills, and then to evacuate the Crimea, maintaining a force of
25,000 in Istanbul for operations in the Black Sea and the Caucasus the following
year.80
At that time, Drouyn de Lhuys approached Veliyeddin Rıfat Pasha, the Ottoman
ambassador in Paris, bringing forward the same issue in a quite different manner and
context than he had previously discussed with the British ambassador. On 14 Novem-
ber 1854, Veliyeddin Rıfat Pasha wrote to Istanbul that he had been received by
Drouyn de Lhuys, who had told him that when the whole of the Crimean peninsula
was captured by the Allies it would not be appropriate to put it under French or En-
glish rule, while its ‘return’ to the Ottoman empire would be the correct path of action.
In such a case, the French foreign minister had stated, since such a land could not be
governed as an ordinary province, it should be ruled by a special viceroy similar to
the case in Egypt and the ideal candidate for that post was €Omer Pasha, the
Ottoman commander-in-chief.81
When this information was conveyed to €Omer Pasha, he politely refused to consider
that possibility, arguing that he was merely a soldier and not suitable to govern such a
critical land, and in any case, at the moment the most urgent task for the Allies was
capturing the fortress of Sevastopol; anything else could be resolved after the peace.82
One could argue that the Ottoman commander-in-chief simply did not desire to jeop-
ardize his current position for an uncertain proposal. Expounding upon this to the
Sultan Abd€ulmecid, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the grand vizier, curtly dismissed the mat-
ter by stating that though the return of the Crimean peninsula to the Ottoman empire

































outcome of the ongoing war and the issue of the governorship of the Crimea could be
discussed only then. A reply in this vein was to be sent to the Ottoman Embassy in
Paris. This line of action was also sanctioned by the sultan.83
The proposal of Drouyn de Lhuys to the Ottoman ambassador hardly reflected the of-
ficial position of France. There is no indication that a similar opinion was ever shared by
Napoleon III or the French government or even they were aware of such a proposal.
This proposal should be understood in the context of the time it was uttered. By then,
even after the victories at the battles of Alma (20 September 1854) and Inkerman (5 No-
vember 1854), the Allied hopes of a prompt capture of Sevastopol had already been frus-
trated. The undermanned Allied commanders had realized that a quick victory was not
in sight. In the meanwhile, the bulk of the Ottoman army was still on the Danubian
front. Therefore, the transfer of the large Ottoman army of €Omer Pasha to the Crimea
became essential to the French and British, who insistently urged for that.84 As the reluc-
tance of €Omer Pasha to leave the Danubian front was well known, it appears that
Drouyn de Lhuys must have made his vague (and most likely unauthorized) proposal
about the ‘return of the Crimea to the Ottoman empire if whole of it would be captured
and €Omer Pasha be given its governorship’ as a bait both to lure the Porte and €Omer
Pasha in person to agree to the swift transfer of troops to the Crimea. The sincerity of
Drouyn de Lhuys was most questionable. It is noteworthy that, only a few days before
he received the Ottoman ambassador, he had read to Cowley a report by Vincent Count
Benedetti, the French charge d’affaires in Istanbul. There, Benedetti accused €Omer
Pasha of never having had any serious intention of following the Russians on the Danu-
bian front, as he dreaded an encounter with them on open ground.85
There was at least one other similar case in which Drouyn de Lhuys made an ‘unau-
thorized’ promise to €Omer Pasha. Soon after his abortive proposal to the Ottoman
ambassador, on 22 November 1854, he cabled to the French consul general in
Bucharest urging the latter to apply pressure on €Omer Pasha (obviously to relieve the
Allied forces in the Crimea) to attack Russians on the Pruth at all costs. In order to in-
duce €Omer Pasha to advance, Drouyn de Lhuys pledged to support him with two
imaginary French divisions without having any intention of doing so. In any case,
€Omer Pasha would not be fooled and refused to move.86 Drouyn de Lhuys admitted
this incident to Cowley, to the astonishment of the British ambassador.87 Learning
this, Clarendon commented:
I am really shocked and ashamed that this announced French movement towards
Bessarabia should have had no foundation at all. I never believed it would take
place but I thought it must have been intended, but the consequence is that Omer
Pacha hesitates to comply with the requisition of Raglan and Canrobert to go
with 18 Battalions to the Crimea until he knows whether his doing so will inter-
fere with the Emperor’s plan of campaign. I hope he will have been told by tele-
graph to comply forthwith and that may furnish the French Government with a
loophole out of their lie.88
Vaillant also disapproved of Drouyn de Lhuys’ clumsy wile, writing to him that too
much finesse would bring harm and ‘It’s the biter bit’.89
The war proved to be a far longer one than the Allied powers initially hoped. The
fortress of Sevastopol staunchly resisted and it tied the Allied armies down for almost
































a year. Throughout all this time, the Allied hold on the Crimea was confined to a thin
strip of coastal land around Sevastopol (which was not even fully encircled) and
Kezlev. Every day of the dragging war cost all the belligerents dear, not only because
of direct combat casualties, but also due to the epidemics, harsh living conditions,
and insufficient care. The financial burden was also swelling fast. On the other hand,
especially in Britain and France, the public was sensitive to the events on the front
which it was able to monitor far more closely and quickly than any of the previous
wars. All these developments certainly affected the war aims and designs of the Allied
powers, including those about the future status of the Crimea.
In the meantime, while the fighting was going on, indirect peace talks were also tak-
ing place in Vienna with Austrian mediation on the basis of the famous ‘Four Points’
which had been formulated by the two western powers and Austria back in August
1854.90 Apparently, as the focus of the negotiations was on the ‘Four Points’, the fu-
ture of the Crimean peninsula was hardly raised during the negotiations which began
on 15 March 1855. As a matter of fact, two months before the Vienna talks had
started, in January 1855, the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef had privately given his
word to Prince Aleksandr M. Gorchakov that Austria would not support the Third
Point which impaired the honour and sovereignty of Russia in the Crimea and on the
Black Sea coast.91 Naturally, such a word of honour would not only effectively im-
pede the discussion of the secession of the Crimea during the talks, but would also
eventually frustrate the peace talks as the Third Point was of foremost importance to
the Allies.
The instructions given to Âlî Pasha, the Ottoman foreign minister and plenipoten-
tiary at the negotiations, by Sultan Abd€ulmecid in March 1855 were characteristic. It
was clear in these instructions that upholding the ‘Four Points’ in the Ottoman inter-
ests was the cardinal issue. There, the preservation of the pre-war territorial integrity
of the Ottoman empire as well its suzerainty over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia
were considered of utmost importance.
Within this context, there was mention of the independences of the Crimea, Circas-
sia, and Dagestan in the instruction. It was stated that, if any changes in the status of
these lands were put on the table, then the question of ‘creating Muslim governments
out of the Crimea, Circassia, and Dagestan under the official protection of the
Ottoman empire and giving Georgia an appropriate status’ might be raised.92
Although ‘delivering the Crimea, Circassia, and Dagestan from the oppressive claw
of Russians and reshaping the status of Georgia would be most preferable from the
perspective of politics, humanity, and the glory of the Powers’, it was admitted in the
instructions that the progress of the war had not reached such a point.93 Given the
conjecture, eventually the Ottoman delegation in Vienna deemed it necessary to keep
silent about these matters.94 It was clear that the Porte had no serious strategy on the
subject of the status of the Crimea and Caucasus which were considered only as bar-
gaining chips or counterweights in defending other issues which were thought to be of
critical importance. No further case is known when these matters were discussed by
the Ottoman authorities until the signing of the peace treaty.
The future status of the Crimea, especially its ‘return’ to the Ottoman empire or its
becoming independent, seldom became a matter of discussion in the Allied high
circles until the fall of Sevastopol on 8 September 1855. To be sure, Palmerston, who

































force Russia to cede the Crimea to the Ottoman empire and Bessarabia to an autono-
mous Moldavia (the latter being under Ottoman suzerainty and under the protection
of the Allied powers including Austria), to restore the independence of Circassia, and
to evacuate the territories which it had conquered in the Caucasus during the last
25 years. Palmerston was conscious that Russia would not accept these conditions. In
that case, which he very much wished, the peace talks in Vienna would collapse and
the war continue. He was sure that the victories the Allies could win in the Crimea by
the end of 1855 would compel Russia to accept these terms.95 There were also mem-
bers of the British Parliament who were curious about the fate of the
Crimea. On 8 June 1855, Spencer Walpole asked the government: ‘Is England to hold
the Crimea? Is France to have the Crimea? Will you restore Mahomedanism in that
part of Europe, or will you give the territory back to the Tartar population?’96
The fall of Sevastopol on 8 September 1855 was a breakthrough in the Crimean
War. The year-long siege of Sevastopol and the great bloodshed for its sake had made
this city seem the prime target of the entire struggle. Once it was captured, it appeared
that the Allies, having already seized Kerch and Yenikale back in May 1855, would
easily occupy the rest of the Crimean peninsula. Such an assumption once more raised
the question of the way the Crimea would eventually be disposed of. In the great eu-
phoria of the victory at Sevastopol, a number of British statesmen, primarily Palmer-
ston and Stratford, advocated continuing the war until Russia was brought to heel.
Writing to Clarendon soon after receiving the good news from the Crimea on 13 Sep-
tember 1855, Stratford urged for pursuing the victory ‘before we can satisfactorily re-
turn the sword to its scabbard’. He was still insistent on creating a buffer zone of
independent neutral states to confine Russia.97
For Clarendon, however, at this stage of war Sevastopol or the whole Crimean pen-
insula was primarily ‘an excellent commodity for the peace market’.98 He thought
that not returning the Crimea to Russia would be the best security against the latter’s
aggression, though he was not comfortable about who should have the Crimea, in
terms not only of military and political practicalities, but also of Christian moral
principles:
England and France even if they had to put a veto upon territorial acquisition
would not consent to either holding the Crimea and if the Turks were to get it
they could not defend it. I know however that this is a favourite scheme with
many persons, but setting aside all other objections I think we could hardly dis-
place a Xtian Power in order to establish a Mahomedan Power there.99
At any rate, he was sure that the Russians would never yield the Crimea to the
Ottoman empire or to anyone.100
Another British personage, George Cornwall Lewis, the financial secretary to the
Treasury, was thinking in the same vein. Upon the fall of Sevastopol he expected that
the whole Crimean peninsula would be in the hands of the Allies by November 1855.
Yet in that case he thought it would be either controlled by Britain and France jointly
or handed over to the Ottoman empire. He wondered how the first option could
work. He was especially troubled by the second option, as he questioned whether this
would ‘be a measure in the interests of civilization, or would Turkey be able to hold if
France and England were otherwise occupied?’101
































In the weeks after the fall of Sevastopol, Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol, the
Austrian foreign minister, prepared a peace initiative which would give Austria the
role of a mediator. Certainly, the initiative had been launched after receiving positive
signals from the belligerents. Russia had indicated its assent to Austrian mediation af-
ter losing Sevastopol. The Ottoman side had suggested its readiness to negotiate.
There had also been promising signs from Paris.102 Count Buol disclosed his plan in
his secret talks with Baron François Bourqueney, the French minister to Austria, in
late September 1855. The Austrian initiative was based on the Four Points of the pre-
vious year which were strengthened in view of the changed circumstances and also
modified to suit Austrian interests. While talking to Bourqueney regarding his initia-
tive, Count Buol revealed that he had also been expecting and even rationalizing an
Allied move to capture the rest of the Crimea. The Austrian foreign minister was con-
fident that the Allies would obtain possession of the peninsula and until then it would
be useless to think of peace. Once the Allies took the peninsula, ‘they would be justi-
fied in keeping the Crimea if they pleased’.103
Britain was informed of the Buol–Bourqueney talks through Cowley in Paris. Al-
though the British would not reject the Austrian initiative outright, its conditions were
considered very unsatisfactory. Not surprisingly, Palmerston was insistent on continuing
the war. He agreed with Clarendon that ‘Russia has not yet been beat enough to make
peace possible at the present moment’.104 Still, he believed that Buol’s conditions for
peace could be made acceptable with certain amendments. Before the peace the Allies
should take the Crimea, Georgia, and Circassia and they could be captured easily by Oc-
tober 1856.105 Clarendon was also convinced that these lands ought to be taken and that
this was possible within a year. Unlike Palmerston, however, who considered the cession
of these border lands from Russia as an essential to permanently cripple Russia, the Brit-
ish secretary of state for foreign affairs saw it as a means to pressure Russia with condi-
tions which it would be unlikely to accept:
Of course as Bourqueney says Russia will try to get rid of all She dislikes in a
Treaty of Peace, but this would apply equally to great conditions as to small and
the more we are able to impose the longer Russia will be in shaking them off and
the more time Europe will have to prevent Her.106
It is notable that at this time Queen Victoria would comment that ‘We ought to be
prepared to contemplate the erection of the Principalities and of the Crimea into inde-
pendent States’.107
For the inclusion of the Crimea in any post-war scheme, it was imperative that all of
it should be occupied by the Allies. However, the fall of Sevastopol was not followed
by an all-out invasion of the Crimean peninsula, if for no other reason, because this
very costly war had already been too prolonged and now the differences between the
objectives of the Allied powers were becoming clearer. The French, who bore the brunt
of the military burden in the capture of Sevastopol and who comprised by far the larg-
est part of the Allied armies in the Crimea were quite content with the glory of this ac-
complishment. To be sure, soon after the victory at Sevastopol and clearly driven by
the success, Napoleon III was reckoning on an easy seizure of the whole Crimea by
forcing the Russians to retreat. He then deemed the possession of the peninsula as a

































Yet General Aimable Pelissier, the commander-in-chief of the French forces in the
Crimea, was very much averse to any forward movement. The French troops were
not expecting any greater glory in the Crimea than they had already achieved and
were more concerned about the notion of a possible future campaign on the
Rhine.109 Accordingly, on 17 October 1855, Napoleon III passed on to Cowley
Pelissier’s view that attacking the Russian positions after Sevastopol was more diffi-
cult than taking Sevastopol itself. The emperor told Cowley that the Allies might be
forced to retire to the French base (at Qamış Bay on Cape Khersonesos) after
completely destroying Sevastopol and to re-embark the greater part of their armies ei-
ther to return home or to attack elsewhere, holding only Qamış Bay, Kezlev, and
Kerch on the Crimean peninsula.110 Napoleon III was indeed confused about what to
do in the Crimea. He thought the partial evacuation of the Crimea the best choice
among many evils and now saw no advantage in taking the peninsula completely. For
him, the results which the Allies prescribed at the outset of the war had already been
attained by the capture of Sevastopol and they would be made binding by the peace
treaty. Therefore, the French emperor concluded, the ‘[Allied] operations for the fu-
ture in the Crimea need only be defensive supported by a strict blockade’.111
Having learned about Napoleon’s opinion, Clarendon, no longer a staunch propo-
nent of the secession of the Crimea from Russia, protested vigorously in his letter to
Cowley in Paris. He was confident that by only a moderate display of determination
and activity the Allies might still strike a decisive blow and obtain the results which
were the essential preliminaries to peace. On the other hand, he wrote, ‘the effect of
withdrawing altogether from the Crimea any large portion of the Allied armies and
bringing them home to France and England would be most disastrous’. In that case,
nobody would believe that the Allies had reached their objective and Russia might lay
claim to victory; even Austria, whose benevolence was bound to Allied military suc-
cesses, would oscillate towards Russia. All these would make an honourable peace
further off than ever. Still, he let the French emperor know that the British had no de-
sire to force their views on Napoleon.112
Eventually, Napoleon III gave up the idea of withdrawal and for the time being
kept the French troops in the Crimea in deference to his allies. Nevertheless, the
French troops were not keen to stay there.113 In view of the ever-increasing costs of
war and the feeling of having already achieved glorious successes by then, the emperor
was becoming loath to continue fighting. Besides, Napoleon III’s advisers were
strongly pressuring him for peace. Count Alexandre Walewski, the new foreign minis-
ter, was the champion of this stand and an ardent supporter of Buol’s initiative, even
when the emperor did not desire Austrian mediation.114
By mid-November 1855, the talks between Buol and Bourqueney proceeded with
the enthusiastic backing of Walewski to produce a plan for an ultimatum to Russia
by Austria which included the earlier Four Points and a fifth one which ensured the
belligerents the right to put forward particular conditions over and above the Four
Points. The change from the Four Points of the previous year was that now a small
piece of territory in the southern part of Bessarabia was to be ceded to Moldavia
(which was under Ottoman suzerainty) by Russia and the Black Sea was to be neutral-
ized.115 All these terms were far softer than the British would contemplate and did not
include any territorial concession on the part of Russia except for the above-men-
tioned Bessarabian land which was added to the plan to suit Austrian interests.
































Clarendon was uncomfortable not only with the terms, but also with the fact that they
were concocted between France and Austria without Britain, not to mention his lack
of trust in regard to the Austrians. Nevertheless, he anticipated a Russian
refusal, which hopefully would result in urging Napoleon to press on with the war.116
Palmerston was much more indignant. On 21 November 1855 he wrote to Jean
Gilbert de Persigny, the French ambassador in Britain: ‘The English nation would be
delighted with a good peace which would assure the objects of war; but rather than
be dragged into signing a peace with inadequate terms, she would prefer to continue
the war with no other allies than Turkey, and she feels wholly able to sustain the
burden.’117
The bombastic tone of this letter could hardly veil the fact that it would not be
plausible for Britain to continue the war without France. Moreover, a day before, the
British cabinet had already voted to accept the ultimatum to Russia prepared by
Austrians and the French. Queen Victoria was also in favour of going along with the
proposal of the ultimatum and urged for moderation.118 Thus, Palmerston was forced
to yield and prepare the British amendments to the ultimatum. His and Clarendon’s
strategy was to insert such clauses in the ultimatum as to ensure its rejection by the
Russians.119 The two British statesmen only agreed to negotiate over the proposal of
the ultimatum lest the French withdraw from the war. They hoped that the Russian re-
jection of the ultimatum would lead to Austria’s participation in the war. Though their
amendments to the proposed articles of the ultimatum were generally quite
moderate, they demanded a special condition for a discussion of the status of the
peoples in Russia’s provinces on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, having in mind Cir-
cassia and Georgia. They were sure that Russia would reject such a condition.120
However, Buol, supported by Walewski, refused to include this special condition in
the ultimatum. Eventually, in order not to lead the Austrians withdraw from the peace
process altogether, Palmerston and Clarendon were compelled to give their approval
to the ultimatum without the special condition. In fact, they had contemplated noting,
before the armistice, that what they had approved were only the Austrian conditions,
not the British ones. Thus, the ultimatum was presented to Russia without the special
conditions about Circassia and Georgia on 28 December 1855.121
A month before this, on 27 November 1855, the strategic Ottoman fortress of Kars,
after a long siege, had surrendered to Russia. Although Russia was otherwise very
war-weary and desperate to accept the terms of the ultimatum as the basis of the peace
conference on 16 January 1856, the victory at Kars had offered it a critical object of
barter on the negotiation table. To the chagrin of Palmerston, the process leading to
the signing of the peace treaty in Paris now began.
By then, any rhetoric or thought on the secession of the Crimea from the Russian
empire had long vanished among the British statesmen. It was notable that the above-
mentioned special conditions were confined to the lands east of the Black Sea, i.e. Cir-
cassia and Georgia, and did not include the Crimea. Even Stratford would abandon
designs for the secession of the Crimea. He wrote to Clarendon on
3 February 1856, three weeks before the opening of the Congress of Paris, that he did
not know what could be done with the Crimea if severed from Russia. For him, its res-
toration to Russia ‘without its fleet and fortifications, laid open to a free
commercial intercourse, and placed under the surveillance of consular dragons . . .

































Accordingly, the Treaty of Paris returned the Allied occupied parts of the Crimea to
the Russian empire and did not include any clauses directly referring to the
Crimean Tatars.123 During the peace conference in the French capital, when the
British brought to the table their ‘special conditions’ about Circassia and Georgia,
these could not be sustained in the face of the lack of will among the other Allies,
including the Ottomans, to continue the war for their sake.124
Throughout the Crimean War, among the Allied powers Britain, or rather certain
British dignitaries, displayed the greatest interest in and devised schemes for the
future of the lands on which they fought. Such schemes involved the eventual cession
of the Crimea from the Russian empire in some fashion. Palmerston and – to a
certain extent – Stratford were champions of this outlook. Their considerations did
not stem from their special concern about the land of Crimea or its inhabitants
per se. These two critical figures of the Crimean War in Britain were determined to
cripple the Russian empire and to stop its southward expansion by means of
depriving it of its colonial holdings in the Black Sea–Caucasus region. This could be
done either by creating a buffer zone of independent and friendly states or by turning
these lands over to Ottoman rule. Only then could Russia be rendered harmless to its
southern neighbours and thereby to global British interests. Especially Palmerston
remained true to these convictions and considered any peace terms which were short
of permanently incapacitating Russia and which did not force it to tangible territorial
concessions would be a waste of blood and money. In fact, Palmerston’s designs
concerning the confinement of Russia went far beyond the cession of the Crimea and
Caucasian lands and involved an intricate reshaping of the map of most of Europe.
However, in spite of the apparent public support for the Crimean War and the
prevalent anti-Russian atmosphere, it is not possible to say that Palmerston’s stance
on these matters, particularly concerning the Crimea, was shared by many in the
Parliament. The aspirations of Palmerston such as restoring the independence of
Poland or at least wresting the possession of the Crimea from the Russian empire
were considered ‘of a very extreme character’, by his political rival the Conservative
Benjamin Disraeli, and not only by the latter.125
The dragging on of the war for another year after the landing on the Crimea, with
ever-increasing material and human costs, certainly played a critical role in jettisoning
the grandiose schemes and lofty ideas of Palmerston, who in that period was in trou-
bled waters at home as well. In any case, the realization of Palmerston’s designs was
contingent upon a major defeat of Russia, which would bring it to heel. Its value as a
naval base, as well as the psychological importance attached to it by the Allies not-
withstanding, for Russia the mere fall of Sevastopol would mean the loss of a periph-
eral campaign, not a sufficiently major defeat for it to be coerced to concede such
terms.126 Moreover, any claims on the Crimea needed to be substantiated by seizing
virtually all of it, while under the given circumstances Palmerston’s Britain was not
likely to invade the entire Crimean peninsula without the military contribution of
France, which in turn was so obviously reluctant to undertake this task. No doubt,
the loss of Kars also seriously weakened the bargaining hand of Palmerston at the
Paris Congress for demanding concessions in the Black Sea area.
Some British statesmen, in the first place Clarendon, demanded the Russian seces-
sion of the Crimea or other lands such as Circassia or Georgia not for its own sake,
but rather as a trump card to pressure Russia to make concessions on other matters.
































Clarendon was thinking of keeping the Crimea for some time during the war also to
affect the political stance of Austria and to make an impression upon it so that the
Habsburg monarchy would not lean towards Russia. Hardly any of the British politi-
cians, including Palmerston and Stratford, who favoured the cession of the Crimea
from Russia, considered the independence of the Crimea viable. For them, in that
case Russia would recapture the peninsula at the first opportunity. That was why Pal-
merston insisted upon offering the Crimea to the Ottomans, whom he thought – with
British support – could manage to hold it.
Generally pleasant relations existed between the British troops and the local
Crimean Tatar population on the occupied lands as far as daily affairs were
concerned. Apart from that, the British interest in the fate of the Crimean Tatars was
confined to a few humanitarian issues such as displaying limited concern about the
care and transportation of refugees in Kezlev. Otherwise, they refrained from any-
thing resembling a political commitment toward them. At any rate, as has already
been shown, the British were keen not to have any involvement in the venture of
Mesud Geray in the Crimea. Perhaps the last occasion when the British showed any
concern about the Crimean Tatars was during the Allied evacuation of the Crimea
following the Treaty of Paris. In an interview with Prince Aleksey Fyodorovich Orlov,
the Russian plenipotentiary to the Paris Congress, Clarendon raised the issue of the
Crimean Tatars who had collaborated with the Allies. Thereupon, Orlov promised
Clarendon ‘that no harm should befall the Tartars in the Crimea who had taken part
with the Allies, and particularly those who had been engaged in the British Service’.127
This last incident might be considered as clearing the conscience of the British, and
personally that of Clarendon, who had once said that the Crimean Tatars must not be
abandoned to Russian vengeance.
The French side was much less interested in the secession of the Crimea from the
Russian empire. When, during the initial phase of the Allied landing on the Crimea, a
few French dignitaries questioned the possibilities of what to do with the peninsula,
they concluded that any independence given to it would not be long-lasting. It appears
that the alternative of turning the Crimea over to the Ottoman empire only became a
subject of discussion when Drouyn de Lhuys abortively attempted to use it as a device
to manipulate €Omer Pasha.
To be sure, it was the French who had recruited Mesud Geray while they had
camped in Varna. However, although this prince of the ex-Crimean Khanate was en-
listed and taken to the Crimea together with the French troops, there is nothing to in-
dicate the existence of any grandiose plans involving the revival of the Crimean
Khanate on the part of Bonapartist France. After all, Mesud Geray Sultan was nei-
ther the most senior nor the most influential figure among hundreds of members of
the Geray pedigree who were spread mostly through Ottoman Rumelia. His being
chosen by the French was purely coincidental, as he happened to reside near the
French headquarters at Varna. In any case, it was Mesud Geray Sultan who offered
his services first. All the evidence suggests that he was taken to the frontline only with
the thought that he might be of some practical use in rallying the support of the local
Crimean Tatars, and nothing more than that. When the task delegated to him was
thought to be completed or his deeds were found to be unsatisfactory, the French
chose to send him back in an honourable fashion. On the other hand, although the

































Crimean Tatars, their record of conduct was not always flawless. There were occa-
sional cases especially involving the French zouaves who committed pillaging and vio-
lence against the locals. Hearing about such cases, Marshal Saint-Arnaud ordered
that these crimes be severely punished.128
After the capture of Sevastopol, the French lost their enthusiasm for fighting for
further conquests and did not wish to continue to spill their blood for what they
deemed to be the objectives of others (the British).129 Therefore, restoring the Crimea
to Russia and returning home became the policy of Bonapartist France.
As for Austria, its primary concern was securing the Danubian principalities and
the mouth of the Danube from the Russian threat as well as increasing its own influ-
ence there. Adding a piece of territory from the Russian-held Bessarabia to Moldavia
would serve this purpose. The Habsburg monarchy was not interested in the secession
of the Crimea from Russia, considering that such territorial concessions on the part of
Russia would jeopardize the latter’s conceding land in Bessarabia. Besides, the
Austrian Kaiser gave his word to maintain the territorial integrity of the Russian
empire in the Black Sea area (meaning obviously with the exception of that Bessara-
bian land).
Given the memories of their suzerainty over the Crimea only 80 years before and
their religious, linguistic, and cultural kinship with the Crimean Tatars, the
Ottomans were expected to harbour certain intentions about the political future of the
Crimea. Yet, with the outbreak of the war, the primary concern of the Porte was
turned to averting the Russian aggression by whatever means and not going beyond
that. The mounting popular sentiments aside,130 the outbreak of war hardly inspired
any revanchist ambitions at the Porte concerning the Crimea or elsewhere. As stated
above, the choice of the Crimean peninsula as the place of the Allied strike was decid-
ed not upon the suggestion of the Ottomans, but by that of the French and British
commanders-in-chief.
The Ottoman war aims did not contain a plan or agreement about the political fu-
ture of the Crimean Tatars even in the case of a victory. The Turkish soldiers of the Ot-
toman troops were certainly in contact with the Crimean Tatars (after all they were
essentially speaking the same language) who viewed them with an unmistakeable sym-
pathy. In late 1854, the Ottoman commander-in-chief €Omer Pasha asked the Porte to
donate grain for some 30,000 Crimean Tatar refugees in Kezlev who were then suffer-
ing from starvation. He also proposed to make use of the able-bodied ones by arming
them. Sultan Abd€ulmecid granted the requested aid the following month.131 In any
case, the recruitment of the Crimean Tatars to the militia had already been started by
then. Indeed, the Ottomans, like the other Allies, did cooperate with the local Crimean
Tatars on practical and exigent matters during their occupation. However, there is no
evidence of systematic attempt by the Ottoman army to activate the Crimean Tatar
population as a whole either in the occupied territories or in other parts of the Crimea.
The official Ottoman outlook was reflected in Mesud Geray’s case. To be sure,
Mesud Geray had been brought to the Crimea without any Ottoman involvement. It
is noteworthy that even when a Geray, one of the heirs of the Crimean Khanate and
an Ottoman subject, was on Crimean soil, the Porte did not contemplate a political
move concerning the Crimean Tatars or making use of the Gerays within the context
of such a design. Although the Ottoman officers on the Crimean front were certainly
aware of the activities of Mesud Geray in Kezlev, an analysis of the contemporary
































documents clearly indicates that Istanbul had no information or interest in the Geray
Sultan’s presence there. None of the several Ottoman documents dealing with the de-
parture of Mesud Geray from the Crimea make any reference to his being a member
of the Geray dynasty and his significance for the Crimean Tatars.
In the document which was submitted to Mesud Geray by the Crimean Tatar
clergy, notables, and other influential members of the population of Kezlev, they
declared that they were ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the Ottoman
empire.132 Nevertheless, even such emotional documents did not seem to inspire
political or military designs concerning the Crimean Tatars among the Ottoman
authorities. In fact, that very remarkable document, which was also presented to the
sultan for his perusal, was classified as a routine paper concerning the person of
Mesud Geray and its contents did not raise any interest, or comment, at the Porte.
Prior to his departure from the Crimea, Mesud Geray wrote a letter affirming his
loyalty to the Porte ‘in the same way as his forefathers had displayed fealty and served
in the past’ (this being the only reference to his royal background, albeit an indirect
one) and stating his wish to serve the Ottoman imperial army. Having received this
letter through €Omer Pasha, the office of the grand vizier questioned Mesud Geray’s
intentions, thereby indicating total ignorance of his activities or potential. The Porte
decided not to give him a reply and it deemed, in the future, it might ‘make use of his
services in case they would be needed’.133 Such a ‘case’ would not take place during
the war. For the Porte, the presence of Mesud Geray Sultan in the
Crimea was nothing more than the voluntary service of a respectable Ottoman subject
in the war. That was why he was later decorated. Otherwise, the Porte was totally un-
aware of, or indifferent to, the presence of a Geray in the Crimean war front.
During the Crimean War, the Porte was submerged in more urgent issues and im-
mediate concerns than the political future of the Crimea. Its basic concern was to pre-
serve the territorial integrity of the antebellum empire. There is no indication that the
post-war status of the Crimea was ever brought forward by the Ottomans, either dur-
ing the war or during the peace negotiations at Paris in 1856. Surely, the concern to re-
gain Kars must have played a significant role in the Ottoman attitude in Paris. The
Porte was very much satisfied when Kars was returned together with a piece of land
in southern Bessarabia, not to mention the neutralization of the Black Sea, in ex-
change for the Allied evacuation of the occupied parts of the Crimea.
It should also be noted that during the Crimean War there was no Crimean Tatar
society or any organized group to lobby the Allies for the societal interests of the
Crimean Tatars either in the Crimea or abroad even at those conjunctures when they
were likely to be heeded. Such groups of national/societal or political assertions would
not emerge for another half a century. Their historical esteem notwithstanding, the
members of the Geray pedigree in the Ottoman domains, including Mesud Geray,
were practically in no position to represent, or stand up in the name of, the Crimean
Tatar people.134 In fact, thousands of Crimean Tatar refugees, who were anxious
that they would pay dearly for having displayed their sympathies to the
Ottoman troops when their lands were returned to Russia, were accepted by the Otto-
mans as immigrants during and after the war.135
For the Ottomans, as was the case for the British and French, the Crimean War
was a war on the Crimea, not one for the Crimea. The well-known African proverb,

































native people of the Crimea. The Crimean Tatars did not simply have to endure the
ordeal of wartime destruction as well as the oppression by many tsarist officials who
saw them as actual or potential traitors: as a consequence of the Crimean War, be-
tween 1855 and 1861, no fewer than 300,000 Crimean Tatars and Nogays were com-
pelled to move to the Ottoman empire. In this great wave of Crimean Tatar
emigration, large numbers of Tatars perished on the way or where they were settled.
As for the Crimean Tatars who stayed in the Crimea, they became a minority, now
under worse circumstances than before. In other words, in the Crimean War, regard-
less of whichever side won, the Crimean Tatars were destined to be the losers. This
was to herald an even greater calamity for them some 90 years later. In the Second
World War, the Crimea became a terrible battleground between Germany and the
Soviet Union and in 1944 the Crimean Tatars were deported en masse from the
Crimea upon Stalin’s orders.
After the Crimean War, while the great exodus of Crimean Tatars from their home-
land went on, the members of their historical dynasty continued to live in a scattered
fashion mostly in Turkey (not to mention the Circassianized ones in the Caucasus). In
fact, apart from its much broader international implications, Mesud Geray Sultan’s
brief ‘visit’ to the Crimea where his ancestors had ruled for centuries carried a symbol-
ic meaning for the Geray dynasty. He seems to be the first Muslim Geray ever to set
foot on Crimean soil again after the Russian invasion in 1783. This episode also
appears to be the last involvement of the Gerays in any kind of political scheme in ref-
erence to their status as a royal dynasty, albeit in quite a vague fashion. Although in
later decades a number of individual Gerays took up political posts in Turkey and in
Bulgaria,136 their genealogical background would have no direct or even indirect
bearing on their political identities and careers.
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131. BOA, _Irade-Meclis-i Mahsûs, Dosya No. 4, G€omlek No. 140.
132. BOA, _Irade-Dahiliye, Dosya No. 309, G€omlek No. 19757.
133. BOA,HR.MKT., Dosya No. 89, G€omlek No. 12.
134. Even in the case of the ‘Circassians’, i.e. the basically Adyge peoples of the Western Caucasus, in
whose land, unlike the Crimea, the armed resistance against Russia was effectively going on and there
were a number of communal leaders and chieftains claiming the allegiance of their compatriots,
there was a similar problem. When Palmerston was mulling over the signing of a peace treaty
between the Russia and the Circassians as a condition to be raised in the Paris Congress in 1856,
he admitted that they did ‘not quite know who could enter into an engagement on behalf of the
Circassians’. Conacher, Britain and the Crimea, p.169.
135. For this wave of Crimean Tatar emigration, see H. Kırımlı, ‘Emigrations from the Crimea to the
Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.44, No.5 (Sept. 2008),
pp. 751–73.
136. The son of Mesud Geray, Mehmed Ali Geray became a member of the Bulgarian parliament (Nar-
odno sybranie). Other Gerays were elected to the parliament of the Turkish Republic, notably
H€usamettin Giray (Istanbul, 1957–60) and Safa Giray (Istanbul and Balıkesir, 1983–99). The latter
also served at various times in 1980s and 1990s as the minister of settlement and public works, minis-
ter of national defence, and minister of foreign affairs.
220 H. Kirimli
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
B
ilk
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] 
at
 0
0:
18
 1
3 
N
ov
em
be
r 
20
17
 
